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Summary findings
Recent  literature  suggests  that  long-run  averages  of  strongly  after  inflation  falls. The  fall in growth  during  a
growth  and  inflation  are only weakly  correlated  and that  crisis and  the recovery  of growth  after  the crisis tend  to
such  correlation  is not  robust  to the  exclusion  of  average  out  to nearly  zero  (even  slightly  above  zero);
observations  of extreme  inflation.  Including  time series  hence  no robust  cross-section  correlation.
panel  data  has improved  matters,  but  an  aggregate  Their  findings  could  be consistent  either  with  trend
parametric  approach  remains  inconclusive.  stationarity  of  output  (in which  inflation  crises  are purely
Bruno  and  Easterly  propose  a nonparametric  definition  cyclical phenomena)  or  with  models  in which  crises have
of high-inflation  crises as "periods  when  annual  inflation  a favorable  long-run  purgative  effect.
is above  40  percent."  Excluding  countries  with  high-  Their  findings  do not  support  the  view that  reducing
inflation  crises,  they  find  no evidence  of  a consistent  high inflation  carries  heavy  output  costs in the short  to
relationship  between  growth  and  inflation,  at any  medium  run.
frequency.
They  do find  that  growth  falls sharply  during  discrete
crises of  high inflation,  then  recovers  surprisingly
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Recent literature suggests that long-run averages of growth and inflation are only weakly correlated and
such correlation is not robust to exclusion of extreme inflation observations;  inclusion of time series
panel  data  has  improved  matters  but an  aggregate parametric  approach remains  inconclusive.  We
propose a nonparametric definition of high inflation crises as periods  when inflation is above 40 percent
annual. Ercluding  countries with high inflation crises, we  find no evidence of any consistent relationship
between  growth  and  inflation at  any frequency.  However,  we find  that growth falls  sharply  during
discrete high inflation crises, then recovers surprisingly strongly after inflation falls.  The fall  in growth
during crisis and recovery of growth after crisis tend to average out to close to zero  (even slightly above
zero), hence the lack of a robust cross-section correlation. Our findings  could be consistent either with
trend stationarity  of output, in which inflation crises are purely cyclical phenomena,  or with models in
which  crises  have  a favorable  long-run purgative  effect.  Our findings  do  not support  the  view that
reduction of high inflation carries heavy short-to-medium run output costs.
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Is  inflation harmful to growth? The ratio of fervent beliefs to tangible evidence seems unusually
high on this topic, despite extensive previous research. In this paper, we address the simpler problem of the
growth effects of high inflation crises. We propose a nonparametric definition of high inflation crises, and
show unambiguous results for the growth outcome during an inflation crisis and for the surprisingly fast
recovery afterward. Our approach is purely empirical, and even then we do not resolve the difficult causality
issues. Our aim is to make progress on stylized facts that can be used for further theorizing.
Our nonparamnetric  approach is simple - we will define a country as in a high inflation crisis when it
is above some threshold level of inflation -- 40 percent is what we choose as explained later. We will then
calculate how that country's  growth performs before, during, and after its high inflation crisis.  We will
examine the robustness of the results to controlling for other factors. The advantage of this approach over the
conventional estimation of a  linear relationship between growth and  inflation, both averaged over some
period, is as follows:
(1) The case study literature on inflation experiences suggests that countries can manage to live with
moderate - around 15-30 percent -- inflation for long periods. Colombia is the classic example. But case
studies make clear that no countries manage to keep stable or otherwise live with higher rates of inflation.
Case studies suggest that high inflation is a different animal than low or moderate inflation.
(2) Assuming a linear or log-linear functional form for inflation and growth is implausible - it is
unlikely that the marginal effect of 100 additional percentage points of inflation is the same when one goes
from 0 to  100 as it is when one  goes from  1000 to  1100. Conventional tests of  the inflation-growth
relationship are jointly testing the hypothesis that inflation matters for growth with the hypothesis that an a
priori implausible functional form holds between the two. Nor is it obvious what functional form should
replace the implausible linear or log-linear form. The advantage of a nonparanetric form is that it is robust
to any monotonic functional relationship between inflation and growth, as well as to threshold functions in
which only high inflation matters.2
(3) The distribution  of inflation  is skewed  to the right, with a small number  of extremepositive
values. Estimated  relationships  between  growth  and inflation  averages  depend  on a small number  of these
extremne  observations,  as previously  pointed  out by Levine and Zervos 1993.  This problem is even more
severe  when one tries  to address  the issues  in (1) and (2) by estimating  spline  relationships  between  growth
and inflation.  Shifts  in the coefficient  on inflation  are even more  sensitive  than the coefficient  itself to the
tiny number of observations  in the higher  inflation  ranges  over which the shifts are being calculated.  The
definition  of discrete  episodes  of high inflation  with a non-parametric  definition  gives a more  robust  test of
the average  growth  associated  with high inflation  compared  to low inflation.
(4) Cross-section  averages  for growth  and inflation  discard  the information  about  what happens  to
growth before and after the crisis.  The case study literature  on high inflations  make clear that they are
discrete  events  with well-deftned  before,  during,  and afters. Models  ranging  from the neoclassical  model  to
endogenous  growth models  of cleansing  recessions  would  predict that growth  will not be the same after a
discrete  episode  of high inflation,  even if inflation  returns  to its original  level.  A nonparametric  definition  of
discrete  high inflation  episodes  will  allow  us to address  the before-and-after  issue.
The rest of the paper  proceeds  as follows.  Section  11  discusses  some of the previous  literature,  the
lack of robustness  of conventional  growth-inflation  associations,  and the choice  of the 40 percent  threshold.
Section III presents the basic results of what happens  to growth before, during, and after high inflation
episodes. Section IV examines  whether the behavior  of growth during and after high inflation  crises is
explained  by other shock and policy variables like wars or black market premia. Section V discusses
interpretations  of  the  results  and  implications  for  further  research.3
IL  Past and present thinking on inflation  and growth correlations
Today's conventional wisdom would lell us that, at business-cycle frequencies, inflation and growth
may be positively related, while that relationship should be negative for the medium and  long-run. The
direction of  long-run causality normally considered is that  running from the  distortive effects of high
inflation and resulting high variability in relative prices to lower growth.  Lower growth could occur either
via a lowering of total productivity,  or through the depressing effect of uncertainty on investment, or through
the adverse effect on efficiency of credit allocation.  The distortive effects should dominate any business-
cycle relationship at  high inflation levels and at long enough period lengths. However, at  lower inflation
levels, the  causality of the  inflation-growth relationship is not so obvious.  Supply shocks, positive or
negative, could simultaneously move growth and inflation in opposite directions and could mask the more
subtle distortive effects of low inflation.
Up until the mid-1970s there was little empirical evidence  for any relationship between inflation and
growth and in the economic development context there were even doubts about which way the relationship
should go.  Some development theories, following a "structuralist" approach suggested situations in which
inflation might be useful for growth through a forced savings mechanism.
2Theories a la Tobin and Sidrausky suggest a positive effect from permanently higher inflation on growth coming from the real
interest rate effect on wealth allocation. The opposite prediction comes from recent growth models with cash-in-advance requirements
for investment,  which would imply that inflation would act like a tax on investhent and lead to negative growth effects of steady-state
inflation (Jones and Manuelli  1993, De Gregorio  1993), implying also that the loss of  output from an inflation crisis will be
perManenL
IMaybe Keynes said it best, "As the inflation proceeds and the real value of the currency fluctuates wildly from month to month,
all perrnanent relations between debtors and creditors, which form the ultimate foundation of capitalism, become so utterly
disordered as to be almost meaningless; and the process of wealth-getting degenerates into a gamble and a lonery." (Keynes 1920,
p. 220). For some modem treatments of such disorder, see Ball and Ceccheti 1990, Tommasi 1994 and De Gregorio and
Sturzenegger 1994.
Israel, for exampic, grew at around 10  percent per annum throughout 1948-1973  with an inflation rate of around 6-7 per annum, both
of which figures were double the corresponding OECD numbers for the same period. The higher, largely anticipated, inflation was a
price considered well worth paying, especially as widespread indexation  of wages, effective exchange rates and savings minimized the
distortionary costs of inflation.  But Israel was no cxception.  For several growing economies in Latin America and Asia similar
arguments could be made at the time.4
But while it was recognized  that high rates of inflation  could  be harmful,  Harry Johnson in 1967
suggested that there was no conclusive  empirical  evidence  one way or the other - as a series of studies in
the IMf Staff Papers around that time bear witness  (Wai 1959,  Dorrance 1963, 1966  and Bhatia 1960).
Even  for Latin  America,  where  higher  double-digit  rates  of inflation  were experienced  during  that period,  the
evidence  well into the 1970s  was ambiguous  (Pazos, 1972;  Galbis, 1979).  Brazil was the standard  high-
inflation  high-growth  outlier.
As we shall  argue below,  the dearth of findings  for the 1950s  and 1960s  is not independent  of the
fact that these were in general  years of only low to moderate  inflation. Thinking  on growth  and inflation
began  to change  after the 1970s  and 1980s  provided  experiences  of high and hyper- inflation  accompanied
by growth collapses.  Indeed, Fischer 1993 found stronger negative  associations  between inflation  and
growth  in cross-sectional  and time series  studies  of a larger  set of countries  and a longer  time span (see also
de Gregorio 1992,  1994,  Cardoso  and Fishlow  1989,  Corbo  and Rojas 1993,  and Barro 1995).
However,  Levine  and Zervos 1993  showed  convincingly  that the cross-section  correlation  between
inflation and growth depends on a few extreme inflation,  low-growth  countries (in their sample, the
influential  points were Nicaragua  and Uganda).  As in the earlier  study by Levine and Renelt 1992,  Levine
and Zervos  found the inflation-growth  relationship  to be strikingly  fragile -- they  did not find inflation  to be
significant  in any of the multifarious  combinations  of variables  tried by their application  of Leamer's
extreme  bounds  analysis. 6
One  exception  in this literature  is an early  pooled  time  series,  cross-section  (43 countries)  study,  using  two  5-year  averages  over  the
period  1956-1965,  by Henry  Wallich  (1969). He  had  hypothesized  a positive  relationship  between  inflation  and growth  and  found  a
negative panial elasticity of 0.04 (incremental annual  inflation of 10 percent yielding a growth rate  reduction of 0.4 percent).
i'The  number  of cross-section  growth  regressions  that  did NOT  find inflation  to be significant  is notable.  By way of illustration,
the survey  of empirical  results  in the text by Barro  and Sala-i-Martin  1995  mentioned  10  right-hand  side variables  for a basic
growth  regression;  inflation  was  not among  them.  They  then mentioned  14  other  possible  right-hand-side  variables  that have
featured  in growth  regressions;  inflation  was  not among  them  either. In fact, inflation  is not mentioned  anywhere  in the Barro  and
Sala-i-Mawtin  text except  in one of the questions  in one of the problem  sets  at the end of a chapter.5
Figure  1 illustrates this fragility in our dataset with  simple cross-section  inflation and  growth
averages over 1961-92 (similar results obtain with partial scatters controlling for other factors -- simple
correlations are enough here for illustration purposes). One is certainly not overwhelmed by the strength
of  the negative association, as there are outliers like Indonesia (IDN), Israel (ISR), Yugoslavia (YUG),
and Brazil (BRA).  As shown in Table  1, the slope of the regression line fitted to this data is significant.
However, the significance turns out to depend on a single observation, Nicaragua (NIC).  The correlation
falls even further if both Nicaragua and Zaire (ZAR -- our answer to Uganda) are omitted. What happened
during  triple-digit  inflation in Nicaragua and Zaire does not seem  like a very  firm basis  on  which to
recommend draconian policies to eliminate a 5% inflation rate to, say, the Bank of Canada.
It is notable that the stronger growth-inflation results obtained recently in the growth literatureuse
pooled, cross-section datasets with decade averages, five-year averages, or annual data (e.g. Fischer 1993).
Indeed, a simple tabulation of growth rates and inflation rates at various inflation frequencies shows that the
extreme inflation observations and the time dimension help to detect growth effects of inflation7  Figure 2
shows such a tabulation for an sample of some 127 countries over the 32 year period 1961-1992  (close to
3000 annual observations).  When inflation rates were below 10 percent, per capita growth rates were of the
order of 2 percent. The observations in this range are disproportionately  for industrial countries, and below 5
percent disproportionately from the 1960s. The growth differences are fairly subtle within the range of 0 to
20 percent inflation. But then growth falls monotonically as inflation becomes more extreme, dropping to -6
percent for inflation rates above 1000 percent.
7 However,  because  the cross-sectionmevidence  is so weak  and sensitive  to outliers,  we also have  little confidence  in asserting  the
claim  that the fixed-effects  time series  correlation  between  growth  and inflation  systematically  differs  from the cross-section
correlation.6
However, we can see in Figure 3 that a monotonic growth-inflation relationship was not evident
even in the pooled annual data before the era of macroeconomic crises began in 1973. Growth actually rose
in the 1960s as one moved from 0 to 20 percent inflation, only falling as one passed 20 percent inflation, and
growth only tums  negative after passing 40  percent. In Table  1, we  see that  the pre-1973 association
becomes insignificant (and positive!) below 40 percent annual inflation.
If we try an in-between frequency like 5-year averages, the results are no more robust. The pooled
dataset shows a significant negative correlation between inflation and growth, as shown in Table 1. But if we
omit the  set of countries that  had inflation at  some point pass 40  percent, then  we  fail to  detect any
significant association between inflation and growth.
Why might the more extreme inflation rates be more consistently damaging for growth? A common
idea in the inflation case study literature is that high inflation is an inherently unstable process, while more
moderate  rates  of  inflation can  be  sustained for  long periods.  Dornbusch and  Fischer  1993 present
convincing evidence for being able to sustain "moderate" inflation; their definition of moderate is 15-30
percent.  It may be that higher rates of inflation are damaging because they create a high risk of even further
loss of macroeconomic control.
We find evidence to support this contention in Figure 4, which shows the pattern of transition from
the 1960s to the 1970s, and the 1970s to the 1980s by showing the maximum inflation rate in each decade
for each country observation. Countries that had left the main cluster of low 1960s inflation rates were those
at risk for the highest inflation rates of the 1970s. In turn, a threshold around the 40 percent mark in the
1970s appears like the gate assuring entrance to the more extreme inflation rates of the 1980s.
In general, 40  percent seems like a  breakpoint for the  risk of even  higher inflation.  Table  2
calculates for the whole period 1961-92  the probability of transition to 100 percent in the subsequent year for7
any given range of inflation in the preceding year.  We note the sizable jump  in that probability as one
moves over 40 percent barfier. According to this calculation, one is running about a 50 percent risk of an
acceleration of inflation into triple-digits during a five year period of 40  percent inflation (assuming the
probability each year is independent,  which likely understates the risk). These transition calculations support
the contention of  Dornbusch and Fischer (1993) that inflation above a moderate range of 15-30 percent is
unstable.  Thc abruptly higher risk of even further loss of  control over inflation may be due to the tendency
beyond a certain threshold to index nominal magnitudes  explicitly or implicitly.
m.  Inflation,  growth, and crisis
In this section, we examine what happens to per capita growth during and after a high inflation
crisis.  We seek information on the following questions: (1) was growth already below normal prior to an
inflation crisis? (2) is growth significantly below normal during the period of the inflation crisis? (3) is
growth above normal after a crisis is over? We will see that the answers are (1) inconclusive, (2) yes,  and
(3) yes.
Our threshold  for  an inflation crisis is annual CPI inflation at  or above 40  percent, measured
December to December, for two consecutive years or more. We exclude one-year inflation crises because
they may reflect one-time price liberalizations or abrupt corrections of overvalued official exchange rates.
By the same token, our definition of ending the crisis is to have inflation below 40 percent for two years
or more.  The  ;0  percent threshold  is chosen because  it is above the range of moderate  inflations of
Dornbusch and Fischer (1993) and into the range where inflation is prone to be volatile and subject to
sharp accelerations. Inflation crises according to this definition may last only a couple of years, or at the
'Our40  percent  definition  of "above  moderate"  roughly  matches  Dombusch  and Fischcr's 15-30  percent  dcfinition  of
'moderate", because they use average year ovcr year inflation, while wc use cnd-of-period over end-of-period.  The formcr
induces some averaging over time of inflation rates and is subject to less  pronounced spikes than the lattcr. (For examnple,  several
of their moderate inflation episodes  include inflation rates that range as high as 35-38 percent in our data).  We prefer the end-of-
year definition because we want to bc as precise as possible about the timing of the crisis.8
other extreme, may drag on for 20 years (Argentina).  The notion of a 20-year-long crisis is admittedly a
bit of a stretch, but Argentina's  long "crisis" is an outlier. The median length of our inflation crises is 6
years. (We will check sensitivity of our results to period lengths of crisis and recovery.)
We also acknowledge that there is some arbitrariness in the choice of a threshold. The date on
which  inflation passes 40 percent may not accord with the subjective perception of when a crisis begins
inside a particular country. For example, in Israel, our definition of a crisis will date the high inflation as
beginning in 1977, while many case study analyses of Israel would date the crisis as beginning in 1974.
However, what we lose in flexibility to analyze each set of country circumstances, we gain in the ability
to statistically test a pre-determined criterion. To check the robustness of our 40 percent criterion, we will
also conduct similar tests for inflation crises in the 20-40 percent range.
Basic result
We first show the list of high inflation crises according to our criterion and report whether growth
in  each country  was above or below  the world  average before, during,  and  after the  crisis.  We are
differencing from the world average (for whatever countries have available data) for each period shown in
each country case.  Table 3 gives the list of 26 countries that had inflation crises at some point over 1961-
92.
We see that in the most of the cases, growth during the inflation crisis was both below the world
average for the period and below the country's  growth prior to the outbreak of the crisis.  It is notable that
some of the  largest outliers in the cross-section relationship (Figure 1) -- Indonesia, Israel, Yugoslavia,
Brazil  - show a clearly  negative intertemporal relationship  between inflation crises  and growth.  The
cross-section averages for those countries had averaged together periods of high growth/low inflation and
periods of low growth/high inflation.9
Moreover,  most of the countries  that had brought  inflation  down  by the end of the sample  period
had growth above the world average in the post-crisis period. The post-crisis  growth rate was further
above the world average than was the pre-crisis growth rate in most of these countries. This growth
acceleration could result from trend reversion after the collapse of output during the crisis; it could
alternatively  indicate  a change  for the better in long-run  growth  after  the crisis. 9
Table 4 gives the averages  of annual data over 1961-92  before,  during, and after inflation  crises
for the whole sample and examines  its robustness. The definition  of inflation  crisis as periods above 40
percent inflation  leads  to no subtle  differences  in inflation  between  crisis and non-crisis  periods:  inflation
averaged above 150 percent in the former and 20 percent or below in the latter. Growth  declines by 2.8
percentage  points from the pre-crisis  period  to the crisis period;  after the crisis, growth  accelerates  by 3.8
percentage  points. The post-crisis  growth rate is I percentage  point above  the pre-crisis  growth rate. All
of these  growth differentials  are statistically  significant.' 0
There has been a global trend towards falling growth and increasing inflation,  not to mention
pronounced  global cycles."  Are common  global factors determining  our results? The third and fourth
columns of Table 4 examine whether  the pattern of inflation  and growth holds up when we difference
each country's growth rate from the world average for each year (i.e. put time dummies). The pattern is
9Acolleague  b-stight to our attention a tersely reported but tantalizingly related finding of Harberger (1988).  Harberger
mentioned that hsr  had found that, in 15 major disinflations, GDP growth was higher while inflation was declining than it had been
while inflation was rising.
1  Some models would predict that the growth rate effect will depend on the length of the crisis period. However, we find no
evidence that the growth rate during the inflation crisis period is correlated with the length of the inflation crisis. For the post-
crisis period, we have the suggestive case of Indonesia with one of  the strongest post-crisis growth rates and by far the longest
post-crisis period. However, apart from Indonesia, we do not find a relationship between the average  post-crisis growth rate and
the length of the post-crisis period.
" Bruno 1993 shows how a number of industrial and middle-income countries moved over  the past 3 decades through a long
cycle, with successive phases of first accelerating growth and inflation, then falling growth and rising inflation, and finally rising
growth and falling inflation.10
robust. We find that countries were below world average growth during the crisis,  and well  above both
world average growth and pre-crisis growth after the crisis. Countries were also significantly below world
average growth prior to the crisis.
We saw earlier that cross-section growth-inflation associations were sensitive to large outliers and
changes in sample period. In the next three  columns of table 4, we omit extreme observations and we
examine  the  pattern  for  the  pre-1973  period.  The  pattern  is  robust.  Growth  is  consistently  and
significantly  below the  world average during the crisis,  and above the  world average after the  crisis
(although magnitudes shift somewhat).  The result that growth is below averageprior to the crisis, on the
other hand, is not robust to change of sample or omission of extreme observations.
In the last column of Table 4, we try one more robustness check. There was a high coincidence
between countries with inflation crises and countries that were affected by the international debt crisis of
the  1980s -- 23 of the 26  inflation crisis countries in Table 3 also rescheduled external debt during the
1  980s. 12 There is some coincidence in timing between debt rescheduling and inflation crises as well. Are the
inflation crisis effects just picking up the calamitous synchronized  effects of the international debt crisis? We
address this by differencing growth rates not from the world average, but from the average of all debt crisis
countries in each year (there were 31 other countries that rescheduled  debt but did not have inflation crises).
Countries experiencing inflation crises were still significantly below the average for debt reschedulers over
the same time periods, and significantly above the debt crisis average after the inflation crisis.
12 The  exceptions  are  Ghana  (who  commercial  banks  would  not lend  to),  Indonesia  (whose  inflation  crisis  was  successfully  resolved
much earlier), and Isracl (who didn't need commercial bank lending).11
Resultsfor  other measures of growth
We probe deeper into this pattern of decline and recovery by examining the components of TFP
growth and capital growth, on the supply side, and consumption growth, on the demand side. For T.P
growth, we use the large dataset of cross-country estimates of capital stocks with the perpetual inventory
method  of Nehru  and Dhareshwar  1993 (since  updated). Table  5 shows that, compared  to the world
average,  TFP growth shows the same pattern of sharp decline during crisis and  recovery afterwards as
overall output growth. (Since we have no measure of capacity utilization in the Nehni-Dhareshwar dataset
-or  any other international dataset -- what we are calling TFP growth would include changes in capacity
utilization  as well as productivity changes.) TFP growth is not significantly below average prior to the
crisis.
The pattern of capital growth is somewhat different -- capital growth definitely is below average
during the crisis, but only average afterwards. In short, the strong output recovery we saw in the previous
table  is explained  by  TFP  growth and  not by  capital growth.  Investment/GDP ratios  show a  similar
pattern - significantly below average during the crisis but not recovering afterward.
The pattern for private consumption growth is essentially identical to the earlier growth results.
Private consumption growth is below average before the crisis (albeit not significantly  so), even further
below average during the crisis, and above average after the crisis.
Residuals fromn  growth regressions
So why was inflation not robustly significant in cross-section regressions? We will now examine
the intertemporal pattern of cross-section growth residuals and we will see that the cross-section averaged
strong negative and positive  effects. An appropriate departure point is the core  growth regression that
Levine  and  Renelt  (1992)  used to  show that  inflation (and  most  everything  else)  was  not  robustly12
significant in cross-section regressions. The core equation regressed per capita growth on investment's
share in GDP, initial income, initial secondary enrollment, and population growth.13  We are interested in
each country's  residual from this regression for the before-crisis, during-crisis, and after-crisis  periods.
To calculate these residuals for each country, we divide the period for the whole pooled time-series, cross
country sample into the three periods corresponding to before, during, and after for that country. We run a
pooled time-series, cross-country regression with three observations (averages or initial values as the case
may  be)  for all  countries, then  extract  the  residuals for  each country.  So for  example,  the  Bolivia
residuals corresponding to Bolivia's  1982-86 inflation crisis are extracted from a regression pooling data
for  all  samnple  countries, with  three  observations averaging  1961-81, 1982-86, and  1987-92 for  each
country:
Growth = 0.0186  -0.0160  (Dummyfor  1982-86)  -0.0066 (Dummyfor  1987-92)
(2.585)  (-4.688)  (-1.293)
+0.1470  (fnvestment/GDP)  - 0.7256 (Population Growth) -9.39E-05 (initial Secondary Enrollment)
(6.626)  (-3.234)  - (-0.779)
-1.  58E-06 (Income per capita in initial year ofperiod)
(-2.1  977)
R-squared= 0.404  T-statistics in parentheses. Each variable averaged over 1961-81, 1982-86, and 1987-
92  for  each country. #Observations = 230.
Table  6 gives the results on  seven inflation crises  for which we  have sufficiently long before,
during, and after periods (we require at least 4 years for each).  Brazil had an early inflation crisis in the
1960s, and we examine the "after" period as the one following this crisis but before the even larger crisis
that began in 1976. Since we have seen that inflation is highly persistent, it is not surprising that one of
13  Our  data sources  are the same  as those  of Levine  and Renelt,  albeit  updated  to 1992:  World  Bank  National  Accounts  for per
capita GDP, Summers and Heston (1991; 1993 update) for initial income and the investment share, and World Bank data on
secondary enrollment and population growth.13
our recovery  cases later turns out to be a backslider.' 4 Indonesia  also had an inflation  crisis in the 1960s,
but unlike Brazil has never  had another.
We see in Table 6 that the pattern is nearly  uniform  in our seven  cases. GroWth  falls sharply  and
significantly  with the inflation  crisis. We have  the statistically  significant  results  that (1) the growth
residual  falls with respect  to the countrys previous  growth  residual,  and (2) the growth  residual itself is
negative  (except for Israel),  indicating  that the country  does  worse  than the world  average during  that
period,  controlling  for the RHS  variables.
The growth  residual  after the crisis, in contrast,  is above  the world  average,  and is above  the
before-crisis  residual  in 6 of the 7 cases  (and statistically  significantly  so). We  again see some evidence
of either catching-up  to a long-run  trend  or accelerated  long-run  growth. Mexico  is the notable  exception
to the catching-up  pattern, although  even  Mexico  is above  the world  average  for growth  over  this period.
We have run the sane regression  using  the investment  to GDP ratio as the dependent  variable,  to
see how investment  responds  to inflation  crises. The results are also shown in Table 6. Although post-
crisis growth recovers, post-crisis  investment  does not.  We also run the growth regressions  excluding
investment.  We still find that growth  - without  controlling  for investment  -- decreases  with the crisis and
then increases  over the pre-crisis  level.
In view of the general  lack of cross-section  association  betweefr  inflation  and growth  averages,  it
is interesting  to examine  whether  these  growth  residuals  are in some sense  averaging  out over the period
as a whole. That is, is the residual  growth  recovery  after  the crisis  just compensating  for the residual
growth lost during  the crisis?  At the end of the period,  is the country  with a crisis and recovery  above  or
4  For the  regression  to calculate  the Brazil residuals,  we  use  Summers-Heston  data  for output  growth because  World Bank  data  is
not available  for the 19SOs.  We  also  omit secondary  enrollment  from the  regression  to calculate  the  Brazil residuals,  because  it is
only available  for a reduced  samnple  in the 1950.14
below where it would have been if the pre-crisis  growth  had continued  unchanged,  controlling  for other
factors?  We test whether  the mean growth  rates  are different  in (1) the pre-crisis  period  and (2) the sum of
the during- and post-  crisis periods.  Using  log growth  rates,  the test is whether  N2*g 2+N3*g3-(N2+N 3)*gl
is positive,  where  N2 is number  of years during  crisis, g2is the (logarithmic)  growth  residual  during crisis,
N3 is number  of years since crisis, g 3 is growth  residual  in period  after crisis, and g, is the growth  residual
in the pre-crisis  period. The growth  residuals  are taken from table 6, where we were controlling  for
investment,  secondary  enrollment,  population  growth,  and initial income,  as well as for the world average
over that period. We also perforn the same  calculation  for Indonesia  from Table 6, which has our
required  lengths  of before,  during,  and after periods but where  we lack data on other  control  factors
except the average  world growth  over the relevant  periods.
As shown in Table 7, all of the countries  with the big exception  of Mexico  are at or above trend
when our observation  of the post-crisis  period ends. Indonesia,  with by far the longest  period since the
crisis, has growth in the crisis and post-crisis  period that is strongly and significantly  above pre-crisis
growth. Aside from Mexico, the other countries  also recover at least to their pre-crisis trend after the
crisis. Hence the Levine-Renelt  growth residuals associated with inflation crises and the recovery
afterward average out to be slightlypositive.  This goes some way toward explaining  why inflation  was
not significant  in the Levine-Renelt  cross-section  regression.
Our recovery periods are obviously  too short to distinguish  statistically  between reversion to a
stationary  trend and an alternative  of permanent  output loss followed  by permanent  growth acceleration.
Regardless  of which it was and if indeed  there was causation  from inflation  to growth, it was striking  that
the countries had erased  the effect of the inflation  crisis on growth  residuals  after a period of recovery of
only 6 years or so. Of course, there was still a welfare loss from the inflation  crisis since consumers  don't15
like higher variance of output and don't  like to lose output today just  to get the same output back
tomorrow.  (We calculate  that, from the beginning  of a crisis using a discount  rate of either 5% or 10%,
the present discounted  values of output deviations associated  with the crisis and recovery are negative
except  for Indonesia.)
Does our "crisis" period contain the initial phase of a contractionary  stabilization from even
higher inflation levels? Do these averages over the "recovery" period conceal an  initial output
contraction,  followed  by recovery?  The cyclical output  effects of stabilization  from extreme inflation  are
the subject of a large and contentious literature;  some authors suggest that there are no output costs
associated  with stabilizing  hyperinflation.' 5 Our focus is on the medium  run rather  than the year-by-year
cyclical variation;  still we want to know if our medium-run  results are due to pronounced  year-by-year
patterns. Figure 5 shows the medians of the year-by-year growth and  inflation data for the seven
stabilizations  in tables 3 and 4, showing  the last 4 years of the crisis period  and the first four years of the
recovery  period. No contractionary  reduction in inflation  is obvious  in this data, either in the late stages
of the "crisis" period or the early stages of the "recovery"  period. It still may be that a stabilization
attempt was underway  and was contracting  output,  but had not yet succeeded  in reducing inflation.  It is
not clear where we would find such a contraction  in figure  5 (we find that money  growth  generally  peaks
the same  year as inflation  in Figure  5). The sacrifice  ratios  that are so high for stabilizing  low inflation  in
industrial  countries  (see Ball, 1993)  are not even obviously  positive in stabilizing  from high inflation.
I  See the classic  article  by Sargent  1982.  Kiguel  and Liviatan  1988,  Vegh 1992  and othcrs  argue that  hyperinflations  can  be
stabilized  at lower  output  cost  than mere  high inflations.  Calvo  and Vegh 1994,  Kiguel  and Liviatan 1992b,  Rebelo  and Vegh
1995,  and others  have  also described  the business  cycle  associated  with  exchange-rate-based  inflation  stabilizations,  which may
lead  to short-run  output  expansion  at some  point  during  the stabilization.  Caivo  and Vegh 1992  argue  that money-based
stabilizations  have first a recession  then  a recovery,  while  exchange-rate-based  stabilizations  have first  a recovery  then a
recession.  We  are not trying  to address  this issue  here - our data  averages  together  money-based  and exchange-rate-based
stabilizations.  Instead  we are interested  in  the average  post-inflation  recovery  over  the medium  run. We are not aware  of any
previous  work  that systematically  shows  the kind  of strong  post-stabilization  output  growth  recovery  over  the medium  run that  we
find  here.16
The averaging out of growth residuals is not as pronounced in the Levine-Renelt  regression
excluding  investment.  Investment,  as we have  seen, was slower  to recover  so that growth not conditioning
on investment  was also slower to recover in these seven cases. We do not have data on Indonesian
investment  in the earlier period.  The three examples  with the longest  recovery  periods show a complete,
or more than complete,  reversion  to trend. Bolivia, Israel, and Mexico  are still below the old pre-crisis
trend, not controlling  for investment.
Moderate inflations
To examine the significance  of our findings on 40 percent inflation crises, we also examine
milder inflation  crises. We examine  episodes  of 20 to 40 percent inflation  that lasted  two or more years,
as listed in Table 8. Dominica, Mauritius,  and Pakistan follow the pattern of negative growth during
crisis, then accelerating  growth  after crisis. However,  the other countries  show much more  mixed results
than our above-40  crises. Countries  like Colombia,  Iceland,  Korea, Phillipines,  Syria, and Venezuela  had
rather better growth during these mild inflation  crises than otherwise. In the aggregate,  we do not find
that countries' growth is significantly  lower (compared  to either the world average or previous growth)
during these milder inflation  crises in between  20 and 40 percent.  The mixed pattern between  20 and 40
percent inflation seems to confirm that 40 percent is a useful threshold  to identify the truly damaging
inflation  crises.
IV. Shocks  and policies  in bigb inflation  cris
In the previous  section  we have  seen that an inflation  crisis  almost  invariably  involves  a reduction  in
the growth  rate while  recovery  from  a crisis is associated  with a resumption  of growth  which  even surpasses
the pre-crisis  growth  rate. But are both growth  and inflation  being  jointly determined  by a third factor  (like a
terms  of trade shock,  war, or political  crisis)?  Is the recovery  of growth  following  the reduction  of inflation17
simply  the  joint improvement  of growth  and inflation  following  the reversal  of a temporary  negative  shock
or the reversal  of some other  bad policy  besides  high inflation?  We will examine  a number  of correlates  of
inflation  like wars, terns of trade shocks,  political  crises, and fiscal policy and see whether  these factors
account  for the  prevalence  of the simultaneous  worsening  of growth  and inflation  in our crisis  cases.
Correlates  of inflation  crises:  shocks  andpolicies
We examine  shocks  by looking  at the correlation  between  inflation  crises and measures  of political
crises, terms of trade shocks,  and wars. We also look at the association  of inflation  crises with policy
variables  such  as budget  deficits  and the black  market  premium.16
Table 9 shows  the association  between  inflation  crises and both shocks and policies. The table
shows  the average  deviation  of each  variable  for countries  that had inflation  crises  from the world average,
for the before-crisis,  during-crisis,  and after-crisis  periods.  Political  crises are measured  by two quantitative
indicators  the literature has found useful to explain cross-section  growth differences  (Barro (1991) and
subsequent work): assassinations,  and revolutions  and coups. Assassinations  are indeed more frequent
during acute inflation  crises while revolutions  and coups seem to be above average before the onset of
inflation crises. 17 A  related variable is wars, which have been strongly associated with historical
experiences  of high inflation.  Wars during 1960-92  are indeed  more common  during inflation  crises than
before  or after such crises, as well as more common  than in countries  not having inflation  crises. Terms  of
trade shocks show some tendency  to be adverse  during and before inflation  crises and favorable  during
recovery,  but these deviations  are not statistically  significant.  We do find that inflation  crises are correlated
with adverse  political  and military  shocks,  not surprisingly.
16 One  other  correlate  of inflation  crises  which  we  do not make  much of in  this paper  (although  we will  control  for it in the next
section)  is income:  none of the countries  with  inflation  crises  were industrial  countries.
l  Cukiermnan,  Edwards,  and Tabellini  1992  link  inflation,  in the form of reliance  upon seignorage,  to political  instability.18
Is inflation  associated  with other  poor macroeconomic  policies?  Table 9 shows  that the association
between  fiscal  policy  and inflation  crises  is very strong  (the data are for consolidated  public  sector  balances
recorded  in IMF and World  Bank reports,  from Easterly  and Schmidt-Hebbel  1994,  updated  by us to 1992).
Countries  entering  into  crisis  have larger  budget  deficits  before  the crisis,  than  even larger  deficits  during  the
crisis, and finally below-average  budget  deficits  during  the post-crisis  recovery.  Not surprisingly,  seignorage
financing  of the government's  deficit  is much  higher  than average  during  inflation  crises  than before  or after
or than in  non-crisis countries.' 3 High inflations may indeed always and everywhere be a  fiscal
phenomenon.
Inflation  crises are also correlated  with high black  market  premia,  a variable  that has featured  in a
number  of growth  regressions  (unlike inflation,  Levine  and Zervos 1993 actually  found the black market
premium  to be robustly  correlated  with growth  and Barro and Sala-i-Martin  1995  actually  mention  it). The
black market premia is already significantly  above average  before the crisis, then is way above average
during  the crisis. This is not surprising,  as it requires  high inflation  to get a fixed  official  nominal  exchange
rate drastically  out of line. After the crisis, interestingly  enough,  the black  market premium  is significantly
below  average.  19
"See again  the Cukierman,  Edwards,  Tabellini  1992  finding.
"One related  correlte of inflation  crisis  countries  tht we  should  mention  in  passing  is their  degree  of central  bank independence.  A
large  recent  litaue  has related  inflation  to thedejre  or defacto degree  of independence  of the central  bank  (Alesina  and  Summers
1993,  Cukierman  1992,  Cukierman,  Webb,  and  Neyapti  1992,  CukiermanJWaitzidakis.  Summers,  and Webb 1993,  Grilli,
Masciandaro,  and  Tabellini  1991,  Fischer  AER  May 1995).  The literaturc  generally  finds  that countries  with more  independent
central  banks have lower  inflation,  with independence  usually  defined  as dejure in industrial  countries  and defacto (measured  by
the tumover frequency  of the central  bank  govemor)  in developing  countries. It will  come  as no surprisc  in light  of this literature
that the tumover of the central  bank governor  (Cukierman/Webb/Neyapti  1992)  is twice  as high  in our countries  with inflation
crises  than in those that never  had crises.  Cukierman  et. al. 1993  have  the interesting  additional  finding  that central  bank
independence  (measured  by a low turnover  rate  of the central  bank governor)  raises  growth  - not  controlling  for inflation  - in
developing  countries,  but has no effect  on growth  in industrial  countries.  An interesting  possibility  combining  our findings  with
those of Cukierman  et al is that central  bank  turnover  does not matter  much in industrial  countries  because  those countries  are not
very subject  to extreme  inflation  crises  in any case.19
Controllingfor  shockcs  and  policies
Many  things are going  wrong  at once  in countries  during  high inflation  crises.  Nevertheless  we find
that our crisis-and-recovery  pattem  of growth  is surprisingly  robust  when  we control  for  the policy  and shock
variables  on which  we have  data.
We run a pooled  annual  time series,  cross-section  regression  of per capita  growth  rates regressed  on
before-,  during-,  and after-crisis  dummies  and the set of policy  and shock variables.  We want to see if we
can still find a significant  crisis-effect  and recovery-effect  controlling  for the policy and shock variables.
The growth literature  generally  shrinks  from running regressions  with annual data because it is unclear
whether  the resulting  coefficients  measure  cyclical  co-variation  of growth  with right-hand-side  variables  or
true long-run  effects.  Here we are not primarily  concerned  with whether  the coefficients  we are estimating
are cyclical  or long-run.  We  merely  want a descriptive  statistic  on the fail in growth  and subsequent  recovery
controlling  for other  factors,  regardless  of whether  the other  factors  are cyclical  or long-run.
Table 10 reports  the regressions.  Grewth  is still significantly  below  average  during inflation  crises
controlling  for a variety  of other  shock  and policy  variables.  Growth  is still significantly  above  average  after
the inflation  crisis controlling  for other shock and policy variables. These results hold whether or not
investment  is omitted  from the  equation.
The right-hand side variables in these regressions  generally have the expected signs and are
generally  significant,  however  we interpret  the coefficients.  High  black  market  premia,  high budget  deficits,
the existence  of wars,  low investment,  and high population  growth  are all adverse  for annual  growth,  but the
effects of inflation  crisis and recovery  remain  after we control  for these factors. These regressions  did not
detect  robust associations  with annual  data between  growth  and political  crises, secondary  enrollment,  and20
terms of trade shocks.  These  latter variables  also reduce  the sample  considerably,  so we try them one at a
time.  The inflation  crisis  and recovery  effects  remain  significant  when  we try these  variables.
We acknowledge  that what  we have  established  is a stylized  fact  rather  than  a structural  relationship.
There  are many  other  possible  influences  on growth  and inflation  for which  we do not have  good  measures.
Nor are we addressing  the possibility  that causality  runs the other direction,  from poor growth  to inflation
crises. It is difficult  to think of time-varying  instruments  that would  affect the likelihood  of inflation  crises
without affecting  growth  directly. 0 The lack of a significant  pre-crisis  growth problem  in countries  with
inflation  crises increases  very slightly  our inclination  towards inflation-to-growth  causality.  The results in
this section also increase our confidence  that the relationship  between growth and inflation  crises is a
phenomenon  in its own  right,  and not  just a reflection  of the growth  effects  of variables  like  wars.
V. Conclusions  and Interpretations
The case  for a negative  association  of inflation  and growth  is firmly  established  when  we look at the
temporal  association  of growth  with discrete  high inflation  crises. The case for growth effects of low to
moderate  rates  of inflation  remains  very much  ambiguous.  Causality  remains  problematic,  but these  results
are consistent  with the view that the costs  of inflation  - relative  price variability,  high volatility  of inflation
itself, uncertainty,  destruction  of information  in prices,  destruction  of the credit selection  process  - only
become  significant  at relatively  high rates  of inflation.  At lower  rates of inflation,  growth  and inflation  may
simply  be  jointly perturbed  by various  demand  and supply  shocks  and hence  show no consistent  pattern.
Confounding  our prior expectations  and conventional  wisdom, we found strong recoveries of
growth following  successful  reduction  of high inflation.  Rapid reversion  to trend could explain why the
inflation-growth  correlation  has proven elusive  in the pure cross-section  analysis  for so long. An inflation
20Barro 1995  suggests  some intriguing  instruments  for inflation  such as colonial  heritage,  but thesc  do not have  a useful  time
dimension,  and so do not  address  the problem  of the fragility  of the cross-section  associations  between  growth and inflation.21
crisis that leaves its mark on the country's  long-run average inflation rate may leave no mark on its long-
run average growth rate, if there was sufficient time to recover from the crisis in the period over which
one is averaging. With complete reversion to trend, inflation crises have a temporary effect on output but
no  permanent  effect  on  output growth.  Inflation  crises  may  after all  be just  a  cyclical phenomenon,
although the cyclical swings are large indeed.
However, the other possibility is also interesting. Growth could be endogenous and output a unit
root process, but growth could permanently improve  over the pre-crisis rate after a successful stabilization.
The historical experience of high inflations is intriguing in this regard.The five hyperinflations in the wake
of World War I -- Austria, Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Russia -- experienced above average growth
in the interwar period after their hyperinflations. The alumni of post-WWII high inflation include two of
the fastest growing industrial countries -- Greece and Italy, two socialist countries that had relatively rapid
growth compared to other socialist countries -- Hungary and Romania, and most notably some of the East
Asian miracles -- China, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan.  The success of this latter group at the very least
reinforces the conclusion from our recent data that inflation crises do not permanently damage growth! 21
What could be the mechanisms for something more than reversion to trend? The idea of the
catalytic crisis is common in the literature. A high inflation crisis may shock policymakers into instituting
produetivity-enhancing reforms that would not have taken place if the country had just muddled along
without severe crises. Mancur Olson (1982) argued that growth will accelerate after crises because crises
21 We looked  at descriptions  of historical  high inflations  in Sargent  1982  (Austria,  Germany),  Vegh 1992  (Hungary  1923-24,
Austria, Germany, Taiwan), League of Nations 1926 (Poland), Schwartz 1954 (Russia), Chang 1958 (China), Makinen 1986
(Greece),  Nogaro 1948 (Hungary  1945-46), Dombusch and Fischer 1986 (Italy, see also De Cecco and Giazazzi 1993), Hamada
and Kasuya 1993 (Japan), Thin 1964 (Korea), Lim 1971 (Korea), United Nations 1948 (Romania), Chou 1963 (China, Taiwan).
For the post WWI data, we use two cross-country datasets to assess the medium-run output pattem in response to the inflation
crises. The first is a compilation of industrial indices for European economies by Svennilson (1954), which is consistent with
individual country estimates for the countries shown here.  The second is the well-known long-run output series of Maddison
(1989), which is what we also use for the post-WWII comparisons.22
result in the destruction  of the old rent-seeking  coalitions  that block growth. High inflations  might induce
such creative  destruction,  at least according  to the famous  dictum  of Keynes:  "There is no subtler,  surer
means  of overturning  the existing  basis of society  than to debauch  the currency."22  Drazen  and Grilli
1993  suggest  that the extreme  costs of high inflation  crises help  end the war of attrition  between  interest
groups  (a la Alesina  and Drazen  1991)  and facilitate  beneficial  policy  changes  such as fiscal reforms.
We have  seen that fiscal  stance  becomes  more  conservative  than  before  the crisis and the black
market  premium  goes below  average  afterwards.  We  have  anecdotal  evidence  of other  policy  changes.
Setting  up an independent  central  bank is one discrete  policy  change  that often  takes  place after  a high
inflation  crisis. This was  the case  in Germany  and Austria  in the 1920s  (see Sargent  1982). It has recently
taken  place in a number  of Latin  American  economies  (Chile,  Mexico,  Argentina,  Peru). The independence
of the Bank of Israel  was significantly  strengthened  by law (forbidding  the government  to borrow)  passed
with the 1985  stabilization.  In a related  vein,  Indonesia  instituted  a balanced  budget  law in 1967  following
its high inflation.  Italy legally  restricted  the ability  of the government  to borrow  from  the central  bank
following  the postwar  inflation  crisis  (Dombusch  and Fischer  1986,  p. 23), although  it left enough  of a
margin  to permit  moderate  inflationary  financing  of the govemnment.
TIhere  has also been  a wave of trade liberalizations  in Latin  America  following  inflation  crises
(Edwards  1994). Rodrik 1994  points  out that  "no significant  case  of trade  reform  took place outside  the
context  of a serious  economic  crisis."  Increased  openness  may both improve  productivity  and itself  be useful
for preventing  a resurgence  of inflation  (Romer  1993)2 Many  of the inflation  crisis countries  went from
22Keynes 1920, p. 220. Keynes attributed this quotation to Lenin, but it has never been independently verified that Lenin said or
wrote this.
23Tomell 1994 provides a theoretical story why an economic crisis was necessawy  for trade liberalization and fiscal reform in Mexico.
The Wall Street Joumal reported after the Mexico crisis that Domingo Cavallo in Argentina took advantage of the emergency
atmosphere to get congressional approval of long-stalled labor and pension laws. (May 12, 1995, p.  1)23
negative real interest rates on time deposits before the inflation crisis to positive real interest rates afterwards;
the promotion of domestic financial savings may be another channel for increased output growth following
high inflation (see King and Levine 1993 on the growth virtues of deep financial sectors).
A recent literature on "cleansing recessions" (for example, Hall  1991 and Aghion and Saint-Paul
1993) provide theoretical reasons why TFP growth may improve after output contractions weed out bad
habits and bad  firms. Ben  David and Papell (1994) find that long-run growth for the countries  in the
Maddison  dataset  accelerated  after major  structural  breaks  accompanied  by  drops  in output.24 They
showed growth continuing to be higher even after the old pre-break trend line was regained.
The dataset in this paper will not allow us to distinguish between trend stationarity and permanent
growth changes. This is unfortunate but for some purposes does not matter, at least over the medium run.
For countries recovering  from output collapse and high inflation, just  catching up  to the old pre-crisis
trend is pretty good news.
Recent events seem to provide additional support for the growth response to inflation crisis that we
have been discussing. The recent hyperinflation in some of the constituent parts of the former Yugoslavia fits
the pattern of the historical hyperinflations of wartime and  political disruption fueling a  budget deficit,
accompanied by output collapse; a fall in inflation in the successor states to the forner  Yugoslavia has been
accompanied by output recoveries2 5 The dramatic output collapse in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
24  It is  interesting  in this connection  to note that Ben  David  and Papell  (1994)  fail (by a large margin)  to reject  the hypothesis  of a
unit root against the alternative of stationarity around a constant trend for Austria, Germany, Italy, and Japan  over the period
1870-1989 (as well as for all other countries that they test, except for the United States). Ben  David and Papell do find evidence
for stationarity after allowing for one trend break in the long-run data. They allow one trend break for each country and allow the
data to determine the date of the break. They find a trend break around the time of World War 11  for Austria, Germany, Italy, and
Japan, after which growth accelerated above trend. For Austria and Germany, their procedure was not set up to discern whether
there might have been trend breaks both after the hyperinflation crises of the early 20s and the crisis of World War 11.  Perron
(1989) finds evidence for trend breaks in the Great Depression and in the 1974-75 oil crisis.
25  Slovenia stabilized in 1993 and began to recover (see Pleskovic and Sachs 1994, and Ministry of Economic Affairs 1993,
1994); Croatia also stabilized in late 1993 and began to recover in 1994 (Hayri 1994); the part of the former Yugoslavia consisting24
Union has occurred simultaneously with high rates of inflation in many countries. While the economies in
transition from planned systems are partlysui generis, their experience fits a larger pattem. Output has begun
to recover in those economies in Eastern Europe that have stabilized inflation, while no recovery is in sight
for  those  economies  of the  FSU where  inflation remains high.  In Latin America,  recently  successful
stabilizations in Argentina, Brazil, and Peru have been accompanied by vigorous output recoveries. Mexico,
which was an exception in our dataset, so far continues to be an exception.
Investment was a big exception to the general pattern of post-crisis recovery. Previous research has
noted a slow investrnent response to policy changes. The slow response may be due to the uncertainty and
loss of credibility created by inflation, as investors wait to see if stabilization is permanent (Pindyck and
Solimano 1993, Serven and Solimano 1993). The slower response of investment compared to growth may
also be related to the findings of Blomstrom, Lipsey, and Zejan 1993 that investment follows growth, rather
than the other way around.
The evidence on  the  growth collapse  during high  inflation crises  and  the  recovery  following
inflation reduction does not support the view that high inflation brings output benefits and stabilization from
high inflation carries output costs.  The favorable medium-run output behavior after inflation stabilization
places an even heavier burden on political economy to explain why stabilizations are delayed (Alesina and
Drazen 1991). For economies that are still stricken by inflation, the pattern of strong output growth after
stabilization also implies a great deal of hope once they finally manage to stabilize.
of Serbia and Montenegro stabilized its hyperinflation in early 1994 --at least temporarily -- and has shown vigorous output
recovery so far (see Bogetic et al. 1995.)25
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Table  1: Robustness of bivariate linear growth-inflation relationships
Cross-sectional linear coefficient of average growth regressed on average log(l + inflation),
1961-92
Coefficient  T-statistic  Sample size  R-squared
Full sample  -0.0162  -2.23  97  0.0398
Excluding Nicaragua  -0.0131  -1.70  96  0.0215
Excluding Nicaragua and Zaire  -0.0090  -1.42  95  0.0096
Pooled cross-section, time series data, 5-year averages, growth regressed on
log(l+inflation),  1961-90
Coefficient  T-statistic  Sample size  R-squared
Full sample  -0.023  -7.87  587  0.0369
Sample excluding countries that ever
had inflation above 40 percent  -0.007  -0.29  459  0.0002
Pooled cross-section, time series annual data, growth regressed on log(l +inflation), 1961-92
Coefficient  T-statistic  Sample size  R-squared
Full sanple  -0.030  -10.74  2971  0.0381
Pre-1973  -0.023  -2.87  858  0.0056
Pre-1973, less than 40 percent inflation  0.052  1.67  831  0.004737
Table 2: Probability  of being  above 100  percent  inflation  in next year depending
on inflation  in current  year
Probability of next year's inflation above 100
Range of inflation  from  this range/l











above  100  71%
/I Calculated  as number  of observations  in this rangefollowed  by 100+  percent  inflation,  divided  by
total number  of observations  in this range (pooled  cross-section.  annual  data, 1961-92).38
Table 3: Growth and inflation crises
(crisis defined as more than 40 percent inflation/or two or more years; shown in grey)
Per capita growth
(difference from world
Country  Years  Pcr capita growth  average)  Annual inflation rate
Argentina  -1961  1971  2.910/o  0.1%  24%
Bolivia  1961  1981  1.6%  -0  R%  13%
1987  1991  0 90%  0.1%  16%
Brazil  1950  1961  3.6%  1.2%  21%
9 ~,1%  ~1.6%W  -1.0%  -. 8
1967  1975  6.8%  4.3%  23%
~~ ~~~0.6%  . - -0.4%9  6%  259%/
Chile  1960  1971  2.4%  -0.4%  27%
1972  5.1_  2400Vo
1978  1992  3.0%  2.3%  22%
Costa Rica  1961  1980  2.8%  0.3%  7%
198  1P  1982k-  -7.0'  (r6.%  /  730%
1983  1992  2.0%  1.4%  17%
Dominican
Republic  1961  1987  2.5%  0.6%  9%...
198S8  1990'  '.Oo.  -3.1 %  - 65%
1991  1992  1.5%  1.5%  5  %
Ecuador  1966  1987  2.5%  0.8%  16%
1988  1992  2.1%  1.6%59
Ghana  1964  1974  0.4%  -2.4%  11%
1975  1983  -4.70/0  -5.8%  71%
1984  1992  1.7%  1.0%  23%
Guinea-Bissau  1988  1992  1.1%  0.6%  58%1
Indonesia  1951  1960  1.2%  -l  1%  21%
1961  1968  . 0.9%/  -2.9%/  189%/
1969  1990  4.2  %  3.2%  13%
israel  ~~~~~1961  1976  4.4%  1.8%  14%
1977  1985  1.5%  0.7%  135%
1986  1992  2.3%  1.6%  17%
Jamaica  1961  1990  0.5%  -1.4%  13%
1991  1992  0.5%  0.6%/  59%/
Mexico  1961  1981  3.6%  1.3%  11%
]982  1988  -1-90/.  -2.5%  86%/
1989  1-~2  1.6%  1.3%  200%
Nigeria  1961  198  7  .0.lOo  -2.1%  11%
1988  1989  5.00/a  3.7%  54%
1990  I~)  2.0%  2.30%  13%139
Table 3: Growth  and inflation  crises
(crisis defined as more than 40 percent inflation for two or more years; shown in grey)
Per capita  growth
(difference  from  world
Country  Years  Per capita growth  average)  Annual inflalion rate
Nicamagua  1961  1983  0.0%  -1.9%/0  10°/
Peru  1961  1977  2.2%  -0.8%  14%
~~~~~7~~~--*978  19  9  o  - :3oOO2.21
Poland  - M1990-  1992  -6.9%  - - -7.0%--  97%
SlerriLeoinec  ---  *#-i-  1  - --^tT9S8  {>., 1991  0  - .5O*S%  .:  -- -0.1%  -. M  82D/
Sudan  1961  1987  -0.5%  -2.5%  15%
.1988'  1991  --2.3%  - -3.0%  MA'
Somalia  1964  1978  1.3%  -2.00/o  7%
__________9S0.  - ~7  --779%  .9S0-  ---  g--8.3%7  - - n  r  v.r
1981  1982  2.6%  2.8%  27%
---  ~~~~~~~~~1983  94  - =t-  .-v/6.3% 
1985  1986  2.5%  1.4%  31%
_-t¢?  n  i  liSi771987  I;e  19  -2.00/a  -- 2
Turkey  1970  1976  4.9%  1.9%  16%
11977;-  1980  -0.5%  - - .44%  - -61%
1981  1983  1.7%  2.00/o  34%
-1984  1992  - 1  2.2%  ^  56%-
Uganda  4  1984  1989  1.0%.-  -2.00,-  131%
1990  1991  0.3%  1.0%/  27%
Uruguay  1961  1962  -0.8%  -3.2%  11%
6  1968  i  - . -v2.8%
1969  1971  2.1%  -1.4%  23%
1972  1980  - 2.9-  0.8%  - 67%
1981  1982  -4.8%  -4.6%  25%
1983  1992 - 1.1%  .0.5%  74%
Yugoslavia  1961  1982  4.5%  2.2%  18%
1983  1990  -1.6%  /-2.3%  188%
Zaim  1964  1975  0.5%  -2.5%  200/%
1976  1983  -3.8%  -5.2%  63%
1984  1986  0.3%  -0.7%  300/o
-1987  - 1992--  - -6.5%  .7.1%  463%
Zambia  1968  1984  -1.6%  -3.5%  12%
1985  1992  -2.9%  -3.7Ye  91%Table  4: Growth  Before  and  After  Inflation  Crises  of 40  percent  and  above,  1961-92
(coefficients  significantly  different  than  zero  at 5 percent  level  shown  in bold,  others  in ilalic4




Sample excluding  Sample  restricted to
Inflation  growth  excluding  countries
rate  Per Capita  Inflation rate  Per Capita  deviations >10%/  Nicauragua  Sample prior  with debt
(percent)  Growth  (percent)  Growth  and <-10%  and Zaire)  to 1973  crises
Before  F'r-  Y'flation Crisis  13%  1.6%  2%.  -0.6%  -0.4%  -0.5%  -0.5%  0. 1%
During  Inflation  Crises  155%  -1.2%  112%  -2.3%  -1.5%  -1.9%  -2.1%  -1.1%
After  Inflation  Crises  20%  2.6%  0°%  1.7%  1.8%  1.8%  1.7%  2.5%
Number  of annual
observations  3225  2970  3225  2970  2806  2909  858  1299
Notes:  Inflation and GDP  per capita  growth bothfrom World Bank  Economic  and Social  Database  (BESD).  averages  are geometric  averages.  Number  of observations  includes  both  crisis
and non-crisis  countries.
CTable 5: TFP,  Capital,  Consumption  Growth  Before  and After  Inflation  Crises, 1961-92
(all variables  measured  as deviation  from  world  average  over same period,  coefficients  significantly  different  than
zero at 5 percent level shown  in bold, others in italics)
Private
TFP  Capital  Investment/  consumption
Growth  Growth  GDP  growth
Before  First  Inflation  Crisis  -0.4%  -0.8%  0.3  -0.6%
During  Inflation  Crises  -1.1%  -2.2%  -2.7  -1.9%
After Inflation  Crises  1.5%  0.1%  -0.4  1.6%
Number  of observations  2337  2337  2856  2475
(1) TFP and capital growthfrom Nehru  and Dhareshwar  1993  exercise  constructing  capital stocks  byperpetual  inventory  method,  updated  to
1992 by  same  authors  in unpublished database.
(2) InvestmentlGDP in 1985 world  prices  from Summers-Heston through 1990, spliced with World Bank Investment/GDPfor  1991-92
(3) Private consumption growth  from World  Bank  Economic  and Social  Database  (BESD)42
Table 6: Growth  residuals  before,  during  and after inflation  crises
(inflation  crisis  periods shown in grey, significant  coefficients  at 5% level in bold type)
Growth  residual  after  Growth  residual
controlling  for  controlling  only for  Investment  residua
investment  and other  other LR determinants  controlling  for LR
Country  LR determinants  besides  investment  determinants
Bolivia  1961-81  -1.6  -0.6  6.2
1987-92  1.2  0.4  -7.4
Brazil  1951-61  0.7  1.6  6.7
...  P i  V,gb,'k.'  1962-66  7  . 3.0  -23  53
1967-75  3.5  4.4  6.8
Chile  1961-71  -0.2  -0.5  -2.6
K[  ~17-37;  _  '2z  - ~5.6  7'  -9_g
1978-92  2.1  1.8  4.9
Ghana  1961-74  -1.5  -2.1  -5.7
1984-92  2.4  1.3  -9.8
Indonesia  1951-60  -1.1
. 1Z ri961-68  a  -)-2.9  4
1969-92  2.0  3.2  9.7
Israel  1961-76  1.4  2.3  8.0
i977-85~"~  7  1.1  0.8  -1.4
1986-92  2.3  2.1  -1.2
Mexico  1961-81  1.8  1.9  1.6
i  *'  1982-88  . -2.0  7  -2.4  -2.1
1989-92  0.7  0.9  0.1
Notes: (t) Figures shown are residualsfrom regressions  on thefollowing long-run  growth determinants:  population
growth, secondary  education,  initial income,  and average  world  growth corresponding  to period shown.
(2) Indonesia's  residual  controls  onlyfor investment  in column 1,  and  onlyfor the world average  in columns  2 and 3.43
Table 7:  1992  per capita income  relative  to pre-crisis  trend
1992 percent difference, Actual  1992  percent difference, actual-
#years  #years  extrapolated pre-crisis trend,  extrapolated precrisis trend,
since end  duration  using growth residual  using growth residual not
Country  of crisis  of crisis  controllingfor  investment  controllingfor  investment
Bolivia  6  5  7%  -14%
Brazil  9  5  7%  6%
Chile  15  6  9%  4%
Ghana  9  9  9%  0%
Indonesia  22  8  128%
Israel  7  9  4%  -14%
Mexico  4  7  -27%  -29%
-otes:
Indonesia  growth  residual  not controllingfor  anything  except  world  average  growth,  because  of absence  of datafrom earlier
period.
Brazil's  crisis  here  is 1962-66  crisis,  and the end of afser-crisis  period  is 1975  instead  of 1992.  Brazil  not  controllingfor  secondary
enrollment  because  of small  sample  available  in 1950s.
Formulafor  log difference  in per capita income,  Actual-extrapolatedpre-crisis  trend=N(2)  *g(2)+N(3)  *g(3)-(N(2)+N(3))  *g(J)
N(2) is number  of years  during  crisis,  g(2) is  growth  residual  during  crisis,  N(3) is number  of  years since  crisis,  g(3) is  growth
residual  in period after crisis, and go)  is growth residual  in pre-crisis  period (all growth residuals in logs)44
Table 8: Moderate Inflation Crises and Growth
(crisis defined  as inflation above  20 percent  for two or more  years,  excluding countries listed in table 3)
Per capita growth (difference
Country  Years  from world average)  Annual Inflation Rate
Algeria  ~1983  1989  -1.0%  10%
~~  *~~iv~9677-7  1-MU-  7-7  20;*T  77:: 
Barbados  1969  1972  2.2%  9%
1975  1992  0.5%  7%
Burkina Faso  1960  1976  -1.2%  4%
-_7-477_..  I7777T777.
1979  1988  0.9  5%
B  u  d  ~~  1978  a99  -3.9%  /  x  290%
1980  1992  0.9%  7%
Colombia  1960  1972  -0.2%  11%
1973  1I982  06  25%
1983  1984  0.3%  17%
- -~~~~ i~~185.  1992  A1.%..-  26%~
Dominica  1969  1972  1.3%  6%
1975  1978  0.3%  10%
- ~~~~~~~  ~~198.  -7.6%  ,  ..  28%
1981  1988  5.7%  4%
Egpt  1960  1987  1.9%  8%
7777~~i~~i9s9  ~~  - -0.i%  - - 25%
1990  1992  -0.4%  14%
El Salvador  1982  1984  -1.7%  13%
- ..  n:z:'n.  1985:,1~~~98  ,  ...  - -0.9%,  . 3  1%O
1987  1992  0.0%  I18%
Gambia  1965  1974  1.6%  5%
1975  196.-.%23%
1977  1983  -1.6%  8%
1984  _  1985  -0.3%  25%
1986  1992  -0.7%  16%
Greece  1960  1978  3.0%  7%
1979  1981  -0  --. 24
1982  1992  0.7%  18%
Guatemala  1960  1984  -0.5%  5%
1985  1986  -4.2%  29%/
1987  1992  0.2%  19%
Guyana  1960  1986  -2.0%  8%
1987  1988  -5.7%  35%
1989  1992  0.7%  3%
Hondumas  1960  1989  -0.9%  5%
1990  1991  -1.6%  29%/
1992  1992  1.7%  7%
Hungary  1980  1989  1.0%  9%
1990  1992  -6.4%  29%145
Table 8: Moderate Inflation Crises and Growth
(crisis defined as inflation above 20 percent for two or more years, excluding countries listed in table 3)
Per capita growth (difference
Country  Years  from world average)  Annual Inflation Rate
1990  1992  -25%0/o  S%
India  1960  1972  -1.8%  6%
- '  7%
1975  1992  1.7%  7%
Korea  1961  1962  -1.4%  7%
1965  1973  4.5%  12%
1976  1978  6.8%  13%
7:777-7  --  .--  ---.-  - SFB--  1.~P  rvl-.0y 9  7  9  X  _  _~179  .9  ___  i  8
1981  1992  6.9/o  6%
Madagascar  1968  1979  -3.0%  7%
- - -.  .-  ah  1980~.  -1982-.  . --  6.6%S  -.  - . :-  28%e
1983  1992  -2.4°q  14%
Malawi  1984  1986  -1.2%  12%
1989  1992  -1.8%  16%
Mauritius  1966  1978  0.1%  8%
-1979  1980  -O6.0Y,  31%
,  ~~~~~-  _.  -_  ,.  . -_  ..  ... d,_.................  -9  -,.....  . .......  .~  ._.........  ._ .I 
1981  1992  4.3%  7%
Myanmar(Burma)  1972  1975i  -1.1%:-  26%
1976  1989  -0.4%  7%
-i99O  1991  ZW  --  - I  7.  -1.4  - MA
Pakistan  1960  1972  0.3%  4  0%
1973  1974  -04°%  - '  29%
1975  1992  2.0%  8%
Paraguay  1960  1983  0.5%  9%
1984  1987  ;2  I0.3.  ;  27
1988  1992  0.3%  23%
Philippines  1960  1972  -1.0%  6%
1973  1974  . 0.8%  31%
1975  1992  -0.5%  13%
Portugal  1960  1975  2.9%  8%
1976  1984  0.7%  23%
1985  1992  2.7%  11%
Syria  1960  1979  0.8%  5%
1980  1981  5.7%  . 233<
1982  1985  -2.2%  13%
Venezuela  1960  1989  -2.5%  10%
1990  1992  5.4%  33%
Western Samoa  1979  1980  -0.1%  27%
1981  1992  -1.7%  9%°Table  9: Shocks  and  Policies:  Averages  Before  and  After  the  Inflation  Crisis
(all variables  measured  as  deviation  from  world  average  over  same  period,  coefficients  significantly  different
than  zero  at 5 percent  level  shown  in bold,  others  in italics)
Shocks  Policies
Wars  Black  Public
Term of  (Dummy  market  Sector  Seign-
Assass-  Revolutions  trade  = I if at  premium  Surplus  orage
inations  and Coups  changes  war)  (percent)  /GDP  /GDP
before  First  Inflation  Crisis  -0.06  0.19  -1.6%  0.027  7%  -1.6  03%
During Inflation  Crises  032  0.08  -1.2%  0.112  36%  -2.2  3.1%
After Inflation Crises  0.02  -0.11  1.7%  -0.010  -9%  2.8  -0.3%
Numberofobservations  3045  2592  1584  3245  2739  1250  1315
Nots
Assassinations  (U  peryear)  and  Revolutions  and  Coups  (O  peryear)  arefrom  Barro  and  Lee  1994  andBanks  1994
Terms of trade  (percent  change  per annum)  from World  Bank  Economic  and Social  Database  (BESD)
Wars  isfrom Sivard  1993, dummy =1 if war on national territory taking  place  in a given  year. 0 otherwise
Black market  premium  isfrom King and  Levine  1993.  Wood  1988.  World  Currency  Yearbook  1985.  and International Currency  Analysis,  Various  Years.
Public Sector  Surplus  isfrom Easterly  and Schmidt-Hebbel  1994.  updated  to 1992.  4
Seignorage  is defined  as (change  in money  base)/GDP.  from Easterly  and  Schmidt-Hebbel  1994  and  IMF, International  Financial Statistics.Table 10:  Regressions  for Annual  Per  Capita  Growth  Rates  and  Inflation Crises,  controlling  for other  factors
Dependent  variable,  per  capita  growth
Pooled cross-section, time series annual data, 1961-92. All variables differencedfrom  world average in each year
Regression  I  Regression  2  Regression  3  Regression  4  Regression  5  Regression  6
CoefFi-  T-  Coeffi-  T-  Coeffi-  T-  Coeffi-  T-  Coeffi-  T-  Coeffi-  T-
cient  statistic  cient  statistic  cient  statistic  cient  statistic  cient  statistic  cient  statistic
Dummy  for non-crisis  countries  0.0024  1.63  0.0022  1.32  0.0034  2.17  0.0026  1.45  0.0042  2.61  0.0030  2.01
Dummy for crisis  countries,
before Ist inflation crisis  -0.0059  -1.43  -0.0059  -1.43  -0.0064  -1.54  -0.0111  -1.91  -0.0021  -0.50  0.0002  0.06
Dummy  for crisis countries,
during crises  -0.0120  -2.75  -0.0093  -2.00  -0.0101  -2.15  -0.0119  -2.44  -0.0154  -3.19  -0.0151  -3.40
Dummy for crisis countries,  after
crises  0.0120  3.10  0.0101  2.02  0.0123  2.88  0.0099  2.11  0.0093  2.07  0.0120  3.00
Log of black  market  premium  -0.0046  -1.77  -0.0048  -1.78  -0.0049  -1.90  -0.0046  -1.31  -0.0084  -2.76  -0.0080  -2.69
Public  sector  surplus/GDP  0.0008  2.89  0.0008  2.77  0.0007  2.43  0.0007  2.02  0.0010  3.15  0.0011  3.92
Wars  -0.0150  -2.60  -0.0152  -2.26  -0.0160  -2.60  -0.0164  -2.43  -0.0136  -2.08  -0.0102  -1.75
Population  Growth  -0.7813  -4.80  -0.7618  -4.41  -0.7694  -3.991  -0.8489  -4.33  -0.6577  -3.23  -1.0461  -647
Income  per  capita  (previous  year)  -3E-06  -7.01  -4E-06  -6.57  -3E-06  -4.44  -4E-06  -6.80  -3E-06  -4.02  -2E-06  -3.99
Investment/GDP  0.0017  6.46  0.0017  5.98  0.0020  6.31  0.0018  5.55
Assassinations  -0.0005  -0.47
Revolutions  and  Coups  -0.0021  -0.85
Secondary  enrollment  (pievious
year)  -0.0002  -1.85  0.0002  2.23
Terns of Trade  Change  (%)  0.0032  0.23
R-squared  0.1694  0.1677  0.1793  0.1778  0.1187  0.1162
Number  of observations  1112  961  999  872  1002  1126  z-Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
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